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PIDS Policy Notes are observations/analyses written by PIDS
researchers on certain policy issues. The treatise is holistic in approach
and aims to provide useful inputs for decisionmaking.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not neces-





*The author is a Senior Research Fellow at the Philippine Institute
for Development Studies.
1Participation rate (or net enrolment rate) is the ratio of the enrol-
ment for the age group corresponding to the official school age of a cer-
tain level, to the total population of the official age groups of said level.
T
here is no doubting the value placed on educa-
tion in the Philippines and the central role it
plays in Filipino society. Its importance is en-
shrined in the Constitution which mandates
that the education sector should receive the highest pri-
ority in the central government budget.
On the surface, the Philippines has achieved sig-
nificant gains in the education sector. Enrolment in the
elementary school system expanded by 2.5 percent yearly
between 1985-1998 while that in the secondary school
system increased by more than 3 percent annually. Clearly,
the growth of enrolment in basic education has outpaced
that of population growth, not a small feat considering
that the Philippine population growth rate remains to be
one of the highest in the region. Consequently, the coun-
try posted a participation rate1 of 95 percent at the el-
ementary level and 64 percent at the secondary level in
school year (SY) 1997-1998 compared to 85 percent and
55 percent, respectively, in SY 1990-1991 (Figure 1).
The public sector served the bulk of students at both the
elementary and secondary levels (92 percent and 72
percent, respectively) while in contrast, the private sec-
tor dominated the tertiary level, accounting for 76 per-
cent.
However, while access to education has been greatly
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be in question. Although the mean percentage scores
(MPS) in both the National Elementary Assessment Test
(NEAT) and the National Secondary Assessment Test
(NSAT) have shown marked improvements, they persist
to be low. In fact, they are significantly lower than the
passing rate of 70 percent (Figure 2). Moreover, the coun-
try ranked very close to the bottom in the Third Interna-
tional Mathematics and Science Study given in 1996. At
the same time, more than 30 percent of students who
start first grade never reach sixth grade and slightly less
than 30 percent of those who start first year high school
do not make it to fourth year. In sum, more than half of
those who start grade 1 do not reach the final year of
secondary school.
how much money there is but how it is spent.
In this regard, this Policy Notes issue looks more
closely into the matter of education finance and manage-
ment, focusing more on the basic education sector.
Management
Intrasectoral prioritization. Prior to 1994, the De-
partment of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) had
the sole responsibility for policy formulation, planning,
budgeting, program implementation and coordination in
all levels of formal and nonformal education in the Philip-
pines. It also supervised all education institutions in both
the public and the private sectors.
During the Aquino administration, Congress created
an Education Committee (EDCOM) which recommended
the “trifocalization” of the organizational structure in the
education sector. Under this policy which took effect in
1994/1995, oversight for the education sector is now
provided by three distinct bodies: the DECS for basic edu-
cation; the Technical Education and Skills Development
Authority (TESDA) for technical and vocational education
and training; and the Commission on Higher Education
(CHED) for higher education (Figure 3).
All three agencies are in charge of policy formula-
tion, planning, programming, coordination, supervision
of public and private education institutions, and standard
setting in each of their respective subsectors. While the
DECS and the TESDA run their own schools and training
centers, the CHED has no direct hand in the operation of
any state college or university.
The CHED is attached to the Office of the President
and composed of full-time commissioners, all appointed
by the President of the Philippines. On the other hand,
the TESDA took over the functions and responsibilities of
the former National Manpower and Youth Council (NMYC),
the DECS’ Bureau of Vocational and Technical Education
and the former Office of Apprenticeship under the De-
partment of Labor and Employment (DOLE). Organization-
ally, the TESDA is attached to the DOLE.
The clamor to improve the quality of basic educa-
tion is naturally translated to an ever-increasing pressure
on government resources given the fact that the Philip-
pine Constitution ordains that basic education should be
provided free by the state. The question, then, is how to
meet the unrelenting demand for more places in the ba-
sic education system (as a result of high population
growth) and, at the same time, improve quality within a
government budget constraint that is already stretched
to the limit. If there were more money to go around, then
perhaps the easiest way to simultaneously address the
quantity and quality issue in basic education is to assign
an even bigger share of the government budget to educa-
tion. However, there is indeed a fiscal constraint. Thus,



























Figure 2. Mean percentage score in NEAT and NSAT
Source: Maglen and Manasan 19993 No. 2000-20
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On the whole, trifocalization is aimed at improving
policymaking, planning and programming at the subsector
level as each one of the three lead agencies is given the
principal responsibility for its respective areas of con-
cern. In particular, the establishment of the CHED and
the TESDA has allowed the DECS to concentrate its at-
tention on basic education. Despite this development,
Figure 3 highlights the fact that the three agencies are
still not focused exclusively on the concerns of their re-
spective subsectors. For instance, the DECS does not
only operate and supervise elementary and secondary
schools but also continues to operate some vocational
schools even as it is engaged in nonformal education.
Meanwhile, state universities and colleges provide a dis-
proportionately large percentage of total enrolment at
the elementary and secondary levels in their laboratory
schools.
Moreover, the gains that have been achieved with
the more focused and better-informed management struc-
ture at the subsector level have been made at the ex-
pense of intersectoral and intrasectoral coordination. In
this regard, it has been noted that the formulation and
coordination of policy at the overall sectoral level (as
opposed to the subsector level) and the prioritization of
the different subsectors in the allocation of resources
have deteriorated since the implementation of the
trifocalization policy (ADB and World Bank 1999). Poor
prioritization of competing demands in the education
sector is perhaps best illustrated in the proliferation in
the number of state universities and colleges and the
increasing budget share of higher education in the 1990s
despite the general agreement that basic education
should receive the highest priority.
Thus, better coordination amongst the three agen-
cies, with perhaps DECS taking the lead role, is called
for in order to address functional overlaps and avoid du-
plication and/or inconsistency of policies, plans, and pro-
grams. However, another agency should be given the prin-
cipal role in setting budgetary priorities for the entire edu-
cation sector. Perhaps the National Economic and Devel-
opment Authority (NEDA) could take on this role. For one,
the NEDA, being at the helm of the development plan-
ning function, is knowledgeable about the workings of
the education sector and its linkages with the rest of the
other sectors. At the same time, not being an integral
part of the education sector itself, it can effectively serve
as the arbiter in the prioritization of the competing needs
of the different subsectors. Lastly, being a member of
the Development Budget Coordinating Committee (DBCC),
which decides on sectoral budget ceilings, it is in a posi-
tion to strategically secure the funding support needed
by the education sector as a whole.
Management structure at the DECS. In principle,
the authority structure at the DECS is hierarchical and
highly centralized. All central office bureaus and major
field offices (i.e., the regional offices) report directly to
the Secretary of Education (CHEG 2000a). The line of
authority extends from the DECS central office through
the 16 regional offices, to 134 division offices, 2,150
district offices, some 36,000 public elementary schools


























Figure 3. Trifocalization of education sector
management and budgeting
Source: Maglen and Manasan 19994 December 2000
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“All authority in the department emanates from the
Secretary of Education. The Secretary has authority over
technical, financial, physical, personnel, tactical and stra-
tegic matters affecting public education delivery. He man-
dates technical standards on curriculum, organization of
classes, textbooks, building designs, teachers’ items and
others. He appoints personnel. He directs instructions
on any operational matters” (DAP 1997).
In practice, many of these functions are delegated
to the Regional Directors and, more recently, to the Divi-
sion Superintendents. While decisions on matters related
to learning/teaching standards emanate from the DECS
central office, most of the decisions on personnel mat-
ters are made at the regional and division offices. More
specifically, the determination of the total number of days
in the school year, the language of instruction for spe-
cific subjects, and the maximum class size are made by
the DECS central office (CHEG 2000b). On the other hand,
the choice of a textbook for each subject is largely a
decision of the DECS regional offices with consultations
from the division offices and, in some cases, the schools
are consulted. Bidding, meanwhile, is managed by the
central office but the regional office pays the suppliers.
In contrast, the appointment and promotion of teachers/
principals, redeployment of teachers, and disciplining of
erring teachers/employees are the responsibility of re-
gional and division offices.
Budgeting in the basic education sector (DECS).
Although regional offices of the DECS prepare budget
proposals yearly with inputs from the division offices,
these are generally trimmed down at the central office.
Because of this, there is a tendency for regional offices
to inflate their budgetary requests (DAP 1997). There-
upon, the DECS budget that is finally proposed by the
central office to the Department of Budget and Manage-
ment (DBM) is many times removed from the proposals
of the regional offices and division offices.
On the whole, the allocation of maintenance and
operating expenditures (MOOE) to the various DECS re-
gional offices and the individual division offices under
each one follows a simple capitation rule. That is, the
DECS central office distributes the MOOE budget to the
different operating units in direct proportion to student
enrolments. Since all division offices, regardless of size,
are mandated to have a uniform organizational and staff-
ing structure, said funding formula is said to work against
school divisions with small enrolment since these divi-
sion offices have to contend with less discretionary re-
sources (CHEG 2000c). This will be discussed in more
detail in a later section showing the resource allocation
for the input mix. Suffice it to say at this instance that for
certain school divisions, per student MOOE has been re-
duced to half its initial value in real terms between 1993
and 1997.
"Although regional offices of the DECS
prepare budget proposals yearly with inputs
from the division offices, these are generally
trimmed down at the central office ... The
DECS budget that is finally proposed by the
central office to the DBM is many times
removed from the proposals of the regional
offices and division offices."
Moreover, the deconcentration that was started in
the 1980s has hardly reached the level of the division
and district, much less the level of the school, particu-
larly with respect to budget execution. Up to 1999, the
DBM did not release funds appropriated in the name of
the division offices (and the autonomous high schools)
under the General Appropriations Act (GAA) directly to
these units. Instead, the DBM regional offices released
the corresponding allotment advice and cash allocation
for the division offices and autonomous high schools to
the DECS regional offices which then in turn released
sub-allotments and funding checks to the said operating
units.
Consequently, a number of Division Superintendents
had claimed that the budgets of the division offices, par-5 No. 2000-20
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ticularly those portions referring to nonpersonnel expen-
diture items, were not known to them prior to the actual
release of the sub-allotments and funding checks. The
division offices did not also maintain separate books of
accounts and instead simply operated on a cash advance
basis relative to the regional offices. Alternatively, they
receive resources “in kind.” In instances when cash re-
sources are transferred, meanwhile, the sub-allotments
and funding checks come with specific instructions re-
garding the use of the funds that are available. As such,
there is very little room for autonomous decisionmaking
at the level of the division.
Starting fiscal year 2000, the DECS, together with
the DBM, has started a system whereby funds are re-
leased directly to the division offices and the autono-
mous high schools. However, only those units that have
one accountant/bookkeeper and one disbursing officer
are deemed eligible to take advantage of this arrange-
ment.
Even with the direct release system now being pi-
loted at the division level, resource allocation decision
at the level of the school will continue to be seriously
limited. This is so because the allotments for the district
offices and the elementary schools, particularly with re-
spect to nonpersonnel cost, remain under the control of
the division offices. The CHEG (2000a) report noted that
in most divisions, the district offices and the elementary
schools receive supplies and materials “in kind” even as
the division offices pay for the utility bills of the elemen-
tary schools and the travel expenses of district supervi-
sors.
It has been argued that the direct release system
which will “bring money lower in the organization” has
the advantage of being supportive of the school-based
management initiative (CHEG 2000a). In terms of gov-
ernment cash management, it offers the added advan-
tage of reducing the cash float, i.e., the amount of cash
which sits unused in the bank account of government
agencies. However, the direct release system requires
the presence of adequate and competent financial per-
sonnel at the level of the division and schools, and the
strengthening of the management information system of
the DECS regional offices and central office to enable
them to carry out their monitoring and evaluation func-
tions effectively.
In summary, the schools which are at the frontline
of the public education system exercise very limited au-
tonomy. This is in sharp contrast to the current world-
wide shift towards the school-based management frame-
work where schools are given the primary responsibility
in deciding how schools should use scarce resources
and how students are taught. At present, initiatives to
introduce this more decentralized framework have been
started and therefore need to be supported. Under these
initiatives, decisionmaking will be brought closer to the
school and community.
Specifically, the division will be assigned budget
preparation, procurement of instructional materials, in-
service training and project management and implemen-
tation. Over time, more responsibilities will be transferred
to district offices and, eventually, schools. To prepare
the school principals for their more active role, they will
be provided with in-service training on school improve-
ment planning and management. It is anticipated that
school principals will be involved in a more substantive
manner in the hiring of teachers, the selection and pur-
chase of instructional materials, and determination of
school size and enrolment. They will also prepare their
budgets and receive direct releases from DBM regional
"...The schools which are at the frontline of
the public education system exercise very
limited autonomy. This is in sharp contrast
to the current worldwide shift towards the
school-based management framework
where schools are given the primary
responsibility in deciding how schools
should use scarce resources and how
students are taught."6 December 2000
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offices.2 They are also groomed to provide instructional
leadership in schools. Lastly, a School Improvement and
Innovation Facility will be established so as to encourage
schools and teachers to introduce instruction-related in-
novations.
Composition of government spending on
education: elementary level versus secondary
and tertiary levels
Efficiency issue. Between 1986 and 1997, public
expenditure on education expanded in areas where the
private sector seemed to be thriving, thus effectively un-
dermining the private sector’s share in the education
market (ADB and World Bank 1999). In particular, the
share of the secondary level in total general government
spending in education expanded. The same is true in the
case of the tertiary level but to a more limited extent
(Figure 4).
The expansion of the public sector at the second-
ary level accompanied the nationalization of barangay
high schools and the Constitutional mandate for free
secondary education. There is some evidence that pub-
lic schools are now “crowding out” private schools as
the number of students enroled in private secondary
schools actually decreased in absolute terms between
1992 and 1998.
For the budget allocation to the tertiary level, mean-
while, its share in total general government spending
stayed fairly constant in the 20 percent range during most
of the 1990s despite the fiscal adjustment measures
imposed during said period.3 This came about with the
surge in the creation of state universities and colleges
(SUCs) during this period. The incentive structure that
drives the unabated increase in the number of SUCs
stems from: (1) the political goodwill that a legislator gen-
erates by sponsoring the establishment of a SUC; and
(2) the higher salary and status that the staff of a sec-
ondary/vocational school derives with its conversion into
a SUC.
These developments are inconsistent with what is
generally perceived to be the appropriate role of govern-
ment in the education sector, i.e., greater involvement in
basic education since larger positive externalities are as-
sociated with elementary level.
Cost effectiveness: private versus public provision.
The public sector consistently underperforms the private
sector in terms of student achievement scores, specifi-
cally in the NEAT and NSAT. However, in the remarkable
improvements exhibited by both sectors in recent years,
the rate of improvement in public schools has been
greater than that in private schools.
Low quality elementary and secondary education
in the public sector is accompanied by high operating
unit costs. Table 1 indicates that public schools at both
the elementary and secondary levels do not compare
favorably with their private counterparts in terms of both
internal efficiency indicators (as measured by the cohort
survival rate, repetition rate, drop-out rate, and comple-
tion rate) and quality of education (as measured by
__________
2The legal and organizational requirements for implementing these
proposals are the subject of the ADB TA No. 3115-PHI on Decentraliza-
tion of Basic Education Management. Said TA is also tasked to recom-
mend the phasing in over time of the various proposals.
3However, the share of tertiary education in general government edu-





























Figure 4. General government spending on education
by level (percentage share)
Source: Maglen and Manasan 19997 No. 2000-20
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achievement scores). The relative cost-effectiveness of
private elementary and secondary education became
more evident in 1997 when the private-public operating
unit cost ratios declined to levels that were about 30
percent lower than the private-public ratio of mean per-
centage scores (MPS) in the NEAT/NSAT. Note that the
private-public ratios of the internal efficiency indicators
for both elementary and secondary schools exceed that
of the operating unit costs by a significantly larger pro-
portion.
Given this finding, the need to shift the emphasis
at the secondary level away from the further expansion
of public education provision towards greater financial
support for private education (in locations where feasible)
becomes apparent. In line with this, a means-tested sub-
sidy program aimed at improving the access of poor stu-
and World Bank 1999). Moreover, the ESC subsidy cov-
ers only 68 percent of the average tuition in private
schools. This amount appears to be too low to bring the
cost of secondary education within the reach of the poor.
In addition, on the part of private schools, delays in the
processing of claims and the release of payments dis-
courage them from participating in this scheme.
Equity issue. The contraction of the share of the
elementary level in total general government expenditure
and the concomitant rise in the share of the secondary
and tertiary levels is likely to benefit the rich more than
the poor. This is so because the participation rate of
children from poor households in secondary and tertiary
education is lower than that of children from better-off
households. That is, while there is a small difference in
the participation rates across income groups for grade 1
(97.3 percent of children from the poorest third of house-
holds and 99.7 percent of children from the richest third),
the gap in the participation rate in sixth grade widens
(75 percent for children from the poorest third and 95
percent of children from the richest third of households).
By third year high school, the participation rate for chil-
dren from the poorest third of households drops to 33
percent compared to 75 percent for children coming from
the richest third (Filmer and Pritchett 1998).
Input mix: personnel versus nonpersonnel inputs
Allocation of public monies is likewise inefficient in
still another area. This refers to the lopsided distribution
dents to secondary education will be necessary. The Edu-
cation Service Contracting Scheme (ESC) can be the ba-
sis for providing these subsidies. However, the ESC has
to be improved. At present, the ESC is not targeted to-
wards the poor and does not differentiate between a stu-
dent who cannot find a place in a public school and one
who chooses a private school for other reasons (ADB
Elementary Secondary
Performance Indicators 1994 1997 1994 1997
Internal Efficiency Indicators
Repetition ratea 6.09 5.05 2.40 2.60
Drop-out ratea 3.15 1.93 1.48 1.25
Completion rate 1.39 1.39 1.13 1.16
Cohort survival rate 1.40 1.30 1.12 1.19
MPS in NEAT/NSAT 1.30 1.24 1.30 1.21
Operating unit cost 1.24 0.88 1.11 0.89
aRefers to inverse of the indicator. This conversion ensures that all
the performance indicators are such that higher scores refer to
better performance.
Source: Maglen and Manasan 1999.
Table 1. Comparative school performance indicators
in basic education (ratio of private to public indicators)
"...The need to shift the emphasis at the
secondary level away from the further
expansion of public education provision
towards greater financial support for private
education (in locations where feasible)
becomes apparent ... A means-tested
subsidy program aimed at improving the
access of poor students to secondary
education will be necessary."8 December 2000
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of the DECS budget in favor of personal services at the
expense of maintenance and other operating expendi-
tures. Without doubt, the underfunding of nonsalary re-
current expenditures contributed to the poor quality of
basic education in the public sector.
Teacher remuneration. Personnel services is the
single biggest item in the DECS budget, the share of which
rose from 74.3 percent in 1990 to 87.7 percent in 1999
(Table 2). The dramatic rise in personnel expenditure is
largely attributable to adjustments in the salaries of pub-
lic school teachers that were implemented by the govern-
ment in the late 1980s and most of the 1990s. Between
1985 and 1997, the remuneration of government teach-
ers went up by a multiple of 5 in nominal terms and by a
multiple of 3 in real terms. In 1997, the entry level sal-
ary of a public school teacher was 70 percent higher
than his/her private school counterpart (Table 3). More-
over, even by international standards, public school
teacher salaries appear to be on the high side. To wit,
teacher remuneration as a ratio of GNP per capita in the
Philippines was equal to 3.0 in 1997 compared to an
“Asian” mean of around 2.5 at the primary level.4
cation, the increase in the number of teachers (teachers
holding position titles Master Teachers I-II and Teachers
I-III) in government schools did not keep pace with the
growth of enrolment in the 1990s. At the elementary level,
the number of teachers rose by 1.4 percent yearly on the
average vis-à-vis a 2.3 percent growth in enrolment. In
comparison, the number of public school teachers in the
secondary level grew by 4.4 percent yearly compared to
a 5.3 percent growth in enrolment. Consequently, the
student-teacher ratio in public elementary schools went
up from 31 in SY 1981-1982 to 34 in 1996-1997 while
in public secondary schools, it increased from 29 to 34.
Teacher deployment. During this period, there was
also no commensurate attempt to rationalize the deploy-
ment of teachers. Thus, teacher productivity did not ap-
preciably increase in line with salary improvements. This
is clearly shown in the wide disparity between the aver-
age class size and the average student-teacher ratio in
public elementary and secondary schools. In SY 1997-
1998, for instance, the average class size in government
elementary and secondary schools were 41 and 50, re-
spectively, while the average student-teacher ratios were
35 in public elementary schools and 34 in public sec-
ondary schools. These figures imply that while there may
be a surplus in the total number of teachers when reck-
oned on a nationwide basis, some geographical areas
Annual Salary Ratio of Public Teacher Salaries to:
of Public School per Capita Poverty Private
Teachersa GNP Threshold Teacher
(P) (family of 6) Salariesb
1985 20,547 2.02 0.91
1988 32,910 2.44 1.15
1991 49,378 2.42 1.13
1994 62,799 2.42 1.18
1997 107,017 2.98 1.50 1.66
aentry level
bSurvey carried out by the Catholic Education Association of the
Philippines, 1997.
Source: DECS National Statistical Office
Table 3. Nominal and comparative changes in public
teacher remuneration, 1985-1997
Given budget constraints, high teacher salaries
naturally limit the government’s capacity to hire new teach-
ers to cope with ever-expanding enrolments. In basic edu-
Expenditure Types 1990 1993 1995 1997 1999
Personnel Services 74.34 82.63 79.34 83.96 87.69
MOOE 16.49 15.05 10.12 8.65 8.85
Of which GASTPE 4.34 3.89 2.61 - 1.10
Capital Outlay 9.17 2.31 10.54 7.90 3.47
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: Maglen and Manasan 1999.
Table 2. Percentage distribution of central government
expenditures in basic education, 1990-1999
__________
4The ratio for the Philippines came from Maglen and Manasan
(1999) while the ratio for the average Asian country came from Lewin
(1997).9 No. 2000-20
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may suffer a teacher shortage because of problems in
the deployment of public school teachers. One problem
is related to the constraints imposed under the Magna
Carta for Public School Teachers with regards to the re-
assignment of teachers across geographical borders.
Another relates to the current practice of assigning teach-
ers to do administrative/clerical functions (that should
otherwise be assigned to lower level positions) at the
school and district offices. Officials of the DECS point
out that this practice came about because of the diffi-
culty in securing the approval of the DBM for nonteach-
ing positions. Such a practice unnecessarily adds up to
costs as clerical salaries are 30 percent lower than
teacher salaries in government. The potential saving that
would be generated by adopting a “teachers-teaching only”
deployment is sizeable – about P2.3 billion per year.
Nonsalary recurrent expenditures. The growth in
teacher salaries was accommodated at the expense of
maintenance and other operating expenditures (MOOE),
i.e., nonpersonnel recurrent expenditures, whose share
in the DECS budget was halved from 16.5 percent in
1990 to 8.8 percent in 1999 (Table 2). Because of this,
per student MOOE declined in real terms from P510 in
1990 to P175 in 1997 (Figure 5). The squeeze on MOOE
has resulted in the short supply of key educational in-
puts like textbooks, teaching/instructional materials,
science laboratory equipment and supplies, and school
desks as well as provisions for teacher training and main-
tenance of school buildings. It is likely that this turn of
events contributed to the poor quality of education ser-
vices in public schools. It could also partly explain why
the achievement scores of students from public schools
are lower than those from private schools even if teach-
ers in public schools are better remunerated (and pre-
sumably better qualified) than their private sector coun-
terparts, particularly towards the latter part of the 1990s.
In 1998, the textbook/student ratio stood at 1:6 in
public elementary schools and 1:8 in public secondary
schools, a far cry from the DECS target of 1:1. To reach
the target, P6.6 billion would have been required in 1999
but the actual budget was only P480 million, just suffi-
cient for a textbook/student ratio of 1:4.
At present, every student at the elementary level is
required to have 8 textbooks. In the short term to the
medium term, there is a need to consider whether or not
all 8 are really necessary. If the number of textbooks
needed by each student were cut from 8 to 6, for in-
stance, it is estimated that the 1999 DECS budget would
yield a textbook/student ratio of 1:3 instead of 1:4.
Another way of addressing the problem would be to
require nonpoor students to buy their own textbooks. The
public elementary school system currently provides places
to more than 90 percent of total enrolment. Out of this,
it is a fact that a substantial portion (around 65 percent)
of those enrolled in public schools can afford to purchase
their own textbooks. Adopting this approach will thus bring
down the budget requirement needed to achieve a 1:1
ratio to P987 million. However, means-tested assistance
would be essential for students from low-income fami-
lies and a community-based approach to means-testing
would increase its effectiveness and reduce the associ-
ated costs.
Summary and conclusion
The need to improve access to and the quality of
education in the country, especially in basic education,
has been raised in a number of studies over the years.




























Figure 5. Evolution of per student MOOE in basic
education, 1990-1997 (pesos at 1993 prices)
Source: Maglen and Manasan 199910 December 2000
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] better coordination amongst DECS, TESDA and
CHED, with perhaps the DECS taking the lead role for
purposes of dealing with functional overlaps and duplica-
tion and/or inconsistency in policies, plans and programs
in the education sector;
] need for another agency, perhaps the NEDA, to
serve as an arbiter in the intrasectoral budget prioritization
in the entire education sector;
] support of current initiatives to strengthen au-
tonomous decisionmaking at the level of the divisions
and the schools, particularly in the area of budgeting;
] shift in public financing towards the elementary
education subsector where larger positive externalities
exist, away from the secondary and tertiary education
subsectors;
] shift in the emphasis at the secondary level,
away from the further expansion of public education pro-
vision towards greater financial support for private edu-
cation in the light of low quality and high unit cost of
public secondary schools;
] redesign of the ESC scheme to function as a
means-tested subsidy program aimed at improving the
access of poor students to secondary education;
] improvement of teacher deployment by review-
ing the provisions of the Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers that relate to the reassignment of teachers to
other jurisdictions;
] improvement of teacher deployment by allow-
ing the DECS to hire needed nonteaching personnel;
] review of the number of textbooks that are re-
quired for each grade level; and
] charging of fees to nonpoor students for the
use of textbooks.  4 4
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